Time Series Foundation Models for Financial Markets: Kronos and the Rise of Pre-Trained Market Models

Time Series Foundation Models for Financial Markets: Kronos and the Rise of Pre-Trained Market Models

The quant finance industry has spent decades building specialized models for every conceivable forecasting task: GARCH variants for volatility, ARIMA for mean reversion, Kalman filters for state estimation, and countless proprietary approaches for statistical arbitrage. We’ve become remarkably good at squeezing insights from limited data, optimizing hyperparameters on in-sample windows, and convincing ourselves that our backtests will hold in production. Then along comes a paper like Kronos — “A Foundation Model for the Language of Financial Markets” — and suddenly we’re asked to believe that a single model, trained on 12 billion K-line records from 45 global exchanges, can outperform hand-crafted domain-specific architectures out of the box. That’s a bold claim. It’s also exactly the kind of development that forces us to reconsider what we think we know about time series forecasting in finance.

The Foundation Model Paradigm Comes to Finance

If you’ve been following the broader machine learning literature, foundation models will be familiar. The term refers to large-scale pre-trained models that serve as versatile starting points for diverse downstream tasks — think GPT for language, CLIP for vision, or more recently, models like BERT for understanding structured data. The key insight is transfer learning: instead of training a model from scratch on your specific dataset, you start with a model that has already learned rich representations from massive amounts of data, then fine-tune it on your particular problem. The results can be dramatic, especially when your target dataset is small relative to the complexity of the task.

Time series forecasting has historically lagged behind natural language processing and computer vision in adopting this paradigm. Generic time series foundation models like TimesFM (Google Research) and Lag-Llama have made significant strides, demonstrating impressive zero-shot capabilities on diverse forecasting tasks. TimesFM, trained on approximately 100 billion time points from sources including Google Trends and Wikipedia pageviews, can generate reasonable forecasts for univariate time series without any task-specific training. Lag-Llama extended this approach to probabilistic forecasting, using a decoder-only transformer architecture with lagged values as covariates.

But here’s the problem that the Kronos team identified: generic time series foundation models, despite their scale, often underperform dedicated domain-specific architectures when evaluated on financial data. This shouldn’t be surprising. Financial time series have unique characteristics — extreme noise, non-stationarity, heavy tails, regime changes, and complex cross-asset dependencies — that generic models simply aren’t designed to capture. The “language” of financial markets, encoded in K-lines (candlestick patterns showing Open, High, Low, Close, and Volume), is fundamentally different from the time series you’d find in energy consumption, temperature records, or web traffic.

Enter Kronos: A Foundation Model Built for Finance

Kronos, introduced in a 2025 arXiv paper by Yu Shi and colleagues from Tsinghua University, addresses this gap directly. It’s a family of decoder-only foundation models pre-trained specifically on financial K-line data — not price returns, not volatility series, but the raw candlestick sequences that traders have used for centuries to read market dynamics.

The scale of the pre-training corpus is staggering: over 12 billion K-line records spanning 45 global exchanges, multiple asset classes (equities, futures, forex, crypto), and diverse timeframes from minute-level data to daily bars. This is not a model that has seen a few thousand time series. It’s a model that has absorbed decades of market history across virtually every liquid market on the planet.

The architectural choices in Kronos reflect the unique challenges of financial time series. Unlike language models that process discrete tokens, K-line data must be tokenized in a way that preserves the relationships between price, volume, and time. The model uses a custom tokenization scheme that treats each K-line as a multi-dimensional unit, allowing the transformer to learn patterns across both price dimensions and temporal sequences.

What Makes Kronos Different: Architecture and Methodology

At its core, Kronos employs a transformer architecture — specifically, a decoder-only model that predicts the next K-line in a sequence given all previous K-lines. This autoregressive formulation is analogous to how GPT generates text, except instead of predicting the next word, Kronos predicts the next candlestick.

The mathematical formulation is worth understanding in detail. Let Kt = (Ot, Ht, Lt, Ct, Vt) denote a K-line at time t, where O, H, L, C, and V represent open, high, low, close, and volume respectively. The model learns a probability distribution P(Kt+1:K | K1:t) over future candlesticks conditioned on historical sequences. The transformer processes these K-lines through stacked self-attention layers:

h^{(l)} = \text{Attention}(Q^{(l)}, K^{(l)}, V^{(l)}) + h^{(l-1)}

where the query, key, and value projections are learned linear transformations of the input representations. The attention mechanism computes:

\text{Attention}(Q, K, V) = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{QK^T}{\sqrt{d_k}}\right)V

allowing the model to weigh the relevance of each historical K-line when predicting the next one. Here dk is the key dimension, used to scale the dot products for numerical stability.

The attention mechanism is particularly interesting in the financial context. Financial markets exhibit long-range dependencies — a policy announcement in Washington can ripple through global markets for days or weeks. The transformer’s self-attention allows Kronos to capture these distant correlations without the vanishing gradient problems that plagued earlier RNN-based approaches. However, the Kronos team introduced modifications to handle the specific noise characteristics of financial data, where the signal-to-noise ratio can be extraordinarily low. This includes specialized positional encodings that account for the irregular temporal spacing of financial data and attention masking strategies that prevent information leakage from future to past tokens.

The pre-training objective is straightforward: given a sequence of K-lines, predict the next one. This is formally a maximum likelihood estimation problem:

\mathcal{L}_{\text{ML}} = \sum_t \log P(K_{t+1} | K_{1:t}; \theta)

where θ represents the model parameters. This next-token prediction task, when performed on billions of examples, forces the model to learn rich representations of market dynamics — trend following, mean reversion, volatility clustering, cross-asset correlations, and the microstructural patterns that emerge from order flow. The pre-training is effectively teaching the model the “grammar” of financial markets.

One of the most striking claims in the Kronos paper is its performance in zero-shot settings. After pre-training, the model can be applied directly to forecasting tasks it has never seen — different markets, different timeframes, different asset classes — without any fine-tuning. In the authors’ experiments, Kronos outperformed specialized models trained specifically on the target task, suggesting that the pre-training captured generalizable market dynamics rather than overfitting to specific series.

Beyond Price Forecasting: The Full Range of Applications

The Kronos paper demonstrates the model’s versatility across several financial forecasting tasks:

Price series forecasting is the most obvious application. Given a historical sequence of K-lines, Kronos can generate future price paths. The paper shows competitive or superior performance compared to traditional methods like ARIMA and more recent deep learning approaches like LSTMs trained specifically on the target series.

Volatility forecasting is where things get particularly interesting for quant practitioners. Volatility is notoriously difficult to model — it’s latent, it clusters, it jumps, and it spills across markets. Kronos was trained on raw K-line data, which implicitly includes volatility information in the high-low range of each candle. The model’s ability to forecast volatility across unseen markets suggests it has learned something fundamental about how uncertainty evolves in financial markets.

Synthetic data generation may be Kronos’s most valuable contribution for quant practitioners. The paper demonstrates that Kronos can generate realistic synthetic K-line sequences that preserve the statistical properties of real market data. This has profound implications for strategy development and backtesting: we can generate arbitrarily large synthetic datasets to test trading strategies without the data limitations that typically plague backtesting — short histories, look-ahead bias, survivorship bias.

Cross-asset dependencies are naturally captured in the pre-training. Because Kronos was trained on data from 45 exchanges spanning multiple asset classes, it learned the correlations and causal relationships between different markets. This positions Kronos for multi-asset strategy development, where understanding inter-market dynamics is critical.

Since Kronos is not yet publicly available, we can demonstrate the foundation model approach using Amazon’s Chronos — a comparable open-source time series foundation model. While Chronos was trained on general time series data rather than financial K-lines specifically, it illustrates the same core paradigm: a pre-trained transformer generating probabilistic forecasts without task-specific training. Here’s a practical demo on real financial data:

import yfinance as yf
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from chronos import ChronosPipeline

# Load model and fetch data
pipeline = ChronosPipeline.from_pretrained("amazon/chronos-t5-large", device_map="cuda")
data = yf.download("ES=F", period="6mo", progress=False) # E-mini S&P 500 futures
context = data['Close'].values[-60:] # Use last 60 days as context

# Generate forecast
forecast = pipeline.predict(context, prediction_length=20)

# Plot
fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(10, 4))
ax.plot(range(60), context, label="Historical", color="steelblue")
ax.plot(range(60, 80), forecast.mean(axis=0), label="Forecast", color="orange")
ax.axvline(x=59, color="gray", linestyle="--", alpha=0.5)
ax.set_title("Chronos Forecast: ES Futures (20-day)")
ax.legend()
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()

SPY Daily Returns — Volatility Clustering in Action

SPY Daily Returns — Volatility Clustering in Action

Zero-Shot vs. Fine-Tuned Performance: What the Evidence Shows

The zero-shot results from Kronos are impressive but warrant careful interpretation. The paper shows that Kronos outperforms several baselines without any task-specific training — remarkable for a model that has never seen the specific market it’s forecasting. This suggests that the pre-training on 12 billion K-lines extracted genuinely transferable knowledge about market dynamics.

However, fine-tuning consistently improves performance. When the authors allowed Kronos to adapt to specific target markets, the results improved further. This follows the pattern we see in language models: zero-shot is impressive, but few-shot or fine-tuned performance is typically superior. The practical implication is clear: treat Kronos as a powerful starting point, then optimize for your specific use case.

The comparison with LOBERT and related limit order book models is instructive. LOBERT and its successors (like the LiT model introduced in 2025) focus specifically on high-frequency order book data — the bid-ask ladder, order flow, and microstructural dynamics at tick frequency. These are fundamentally different from K-line models. Kronos operates on aggregated candlestick data; LOBERT operates on raw message streams. For different timeframes and strategies, one may be more appropriate than the other. A high-frequency market-making strategy needs LOBERT’s tick-level granularity; a medium-term directional strategy might benefit more from Kronos’s cross-market pre-training.

Connecting to Traditional Approaches: GARCH, ARIMA, and Where Foundation Models Fit

Let me be direct: I’m skeptical of any framework that claims to replace decades of econometric research without clear evidence of superior out-of-sample performance. GARCH models, despite their simplicity, have proven remarkably robust for volatility forecasting. ARIMA and its variants remain useful for univariate time series with clear trend and seasonal components. The efficient market hypothesis — in its various forms — tells us that predictable patterns should be arbitraged away, which raises uncomfortable questions about why a foundation model should succeed where traditional methods have struggled.

That said, there’s a nuanced way to think about this. Foundation models like Kronos aren’t necessarily replacing GARCH or ARIMA; they’re operating at a different level of abstraction. GARCH models make specific parametric assumptions about how variance evolves over time. Kronos makes no such assumptions — it learns the dynamics directly from data. In situations where the data-generating process is complex, non-linear, and regime-dependent, the flexible representation power of transformers may outperform parametric models that impose strong structure.

Consider volatility forecasting, traditionally the domain of GARCH. A GARCH(1,1) model assumes that today’s variance is a linear function of yesterday’s variance and squared returns. This is obviously a simplification. Real volatility exhibits jumps, leverage effects, and stochastic volatility that GARCH can only approximate. Kronos, by learning from 12 billion K-lines, may have captured volatility dynamics that parametric models cannot express — but we need to see rigorous out-of-sample evidence before concluding this.

The relationship between foundation models and traditional methods is likely complementary rather than substitutive. A quant practitioner might use GARCH for quick volatility estimates, Kronos for scenario generation and cross-asset signals, and domain-specific models (like LOBERT) for microstructure. The key is understanding each tool’s strengths and limitations.

Here’s a quick visualization of what volatility clustering looks like in real financial data — notice how periods of high volatility tend to cluster together:

import yfinance as yf
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

# Fetch SPY data
data = yf.download("SPY", start="2020-01-01", end="2024-12-31", progress=False)
returns = data['Close'].pct_change().dropna() * 100

fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(12, 4))
ax.plot(returns.index, returns.values, color='steelblue', linewidth=0.8)
ax.axhline(y=returns.std(), color='red', linestyle='--', alpha=0.5, label='1 Std Dev')
ax.axhline(y=-returns.std(), color='red', linestyle='--', alpha=0.5)
ax.set_title("Daily Returns (%) — Volatility Clustering Visible", fontsize=12)
ax.set_ylabel("Return %")
ax.legend()
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()

Foundation Model Forecast: SPY Price (Chronos — comparable to Kronos approach)

Foundation Model Forecast: SPY Price (Chronos — comparable to Kronos approach)

Practical Implications for Quant Practitioners

For those of us building trading systems, what does this actually mean? Several practical considerations emerge:

Data efficiency is perhaps the biggest win. Pre-trained models can achieve reasonable performance on tasks where traditional approaches would require years of historical data. If you’re entering a new market or asset class, Kronos’s pre-trained representations may allow you to develop viable strategies faster than building from scratch. Consider the typical quant workflow: you want to trade a new futures contract. Historically, you’d need months or years of data before you could trust any statistical model. With a foundation model, you can potentially start with reasonable forecasts almost immediately, then refine as new data arrives. This changes the economics of market entry.

Synthetic data generation addresses one of quant finance’s most persistent problems: limited backtesting data. Generating realistic market scenarios with Kronos could enable stress testing, robustness checks, and strategy development in data-sparse environments. Imagine training a strategy on 100 years of synthetic data that preserves the statistical properties of your target market — this could significantly reduce overfitting to historical idiosyncrasies. The distribution of returns, the clustering of volatility, the correlation structure during crises — all could be sampled from the learned model. This is particularly valuable for volatility strategies, where the most interesting regimes (tail events, sustained elevated volatility) are precisely the ones with least historical data.

Cross-asset learning is particularly valuable for multi-strategy firms. Kronos’s pre-training on 45 exchanges means it has learned relationships between markets that might not be apparent from single-market analysis. This could inform diversification decisions, correlation forecasting, and inter-market arbitrage. If the model has seen how the VIX relates to SPX volatility, how crude oil spreads behave relative to natural gas, or how emerging market currencies react to Fed policy, that knowledge is embedded in the pre-trained weights.

Strategy discovery is a more speculative but potentially transformative application. Foundation models can identify patterns that human intuition misses. By generating forecasts and analyzing residuals, we might discover alpha sources that traditional factor models or time series analysis would never surface. This requires careful validation — spurious patterns in synthetic data can be as dangerous as overfitting to historical noise — but the possibility space expands significantly.

Integration challenges should not be underestimated. Foundation models require different infrastructure than traditional statistical models — GPU acceleration, careful handling of numerical precision, understanding of model behavior in distribution shift scenarios. The operational overhead is non-trivial. You’ll need MLOps capabilities that many quant firms have historically underinvested in. Model versioning, monitoring for concept drift, automated retraining pipelines — these become essential rather than optional.

There’s also a workflow consideration. Traditional quant research often follows a familiar pattern: load data, fit model, evaluate, iterate. Foundation models introduce a new paradigm: download pre-trained model, design prompt or fine-tuning strategy, evaluate on holdout, deploy. The skills required are different. Understanding transformer architectures, attention mechanisms, and the nuances of transfer learning matters more than knowing the mathematical properties of GARCH innovations.

For teams considering adoption, I’d suggest a staged approach. Start with the zero-shot capabilities to establish baselines. Then explore fine-tuning on your specific datasets. Then investigate synthetic data generation for robustness testing. Each stage builds organizational capability while managing risk. Don’t bet the firm on the first experiment, but don’t dismiss it because it’s unfamiliar either.

Limitations and Open Questions

I want to be clear-eyed about what we don’t yet know. The Kronos paper, while impressive, represents early research. Several critical questions remain:

Out-of-sample robustness: The paper’s results are based on benchmark datasets. How does Kronos perform on truly novel market regimes — a pandemic, a currency crisis, a flash crash? Foundation models can be brittle when confronted with distributions far from their training data. This is particularly concerning in finance, where the most important events are precisely the ones that don’t resemble historical “normal” periods. The 2020 COVID crash, the 2022 LDI crisis, the 2023 regional banking stress — these were regime changes, not business-as-usual. We need evidence that Kronos handles these appropriately.

Overfitting to historical patterns: Pre-training on 12 billion K-lines means the model has seen enormous variety, but it has also seen a particular slice of market history. Markets evolve; regulatory frameworks change; new asset classes emerge; market microstructure transforms. A model trained on historical data may be implicitly betting on the persistence of past patterns. The very fact that the model learned from successful trading strategies embedded in historical data — if those strategies still exist — is no guarantee they’ll work going forward.

Interpretability: GARCH models give us interpretable parameters — alpha and beta tell us about persistence and shock sensitivity. Kronos is a black box. For risk management and regulatory compliance, understanding why a model makes predictions can be as important as the predictions themselves. When a position loses money, can you explain why the model forecasted that outcome? Can you stress-test the model by understanding its failure modes? These questions matter for operational risk and for satisfying increasingly demanding regulatory requirements around model governance.

Execution feasibility: Even if Kronos generates excellent forecasts, turning those forecasts into a trading strategy involves slippage, transaction costs, liquidity constraints, and market impact. The paper doesn’t address whether the forecasted signals are economically exploitable after costs. A forecast that’s statistically significant but not economically significant after transaction costs is useless for trading. We need research that connects model outputs to realistic execution assumptions.

Benchmarks and comparability: The time series foundation model literature lacks standardized benchmarks for financial applications. Different papers use different datasets, different evaluation windows, and different metrics. This makes it difficult to compare Kronos fairly against alternatives. We need the financial equivalent of ImageNet or GLUE — standardized benchmarks that allow rigorous comparison across approaches.

Compute requirements: Running a model like Kronos in production requires significant computational resources. Not every quant firm has GPU clusters sitting idle. The inference cost — the cost to generate each forecast — matters for strategy economics. If each forecast costs $0.01 in compute and you’re making predictions every minute across thousands of instruments, those costs add up. We need to understand the cost-benefit tradeoff.

Regulatory uncertainty: Financial regulators are still grappling with how to think about machine learning models in trading. Foundation models add another layer of complexity. Questions around model validation, explainability, and governance remain largely unresolved. Firms adopting these technologies need to stay close to regulatory developments.

Finally, there’s a philosophical concern worth mentioning. Foundation models learn from data created by human traders, market makers, and algorithmic systems — all of whom are themselves trying to profit from patterns in the data. If Kronos learns the patterns that allowed certain traders to succeed historically, and many traders adopt similar models, those patterns may become less profitable. This is the standard arms race argument applied to a new context. Foundation models may accelerate the pace at which patterns get arbitraged away.

The Road Ahead: NeurIPS 2025 and Beyond

The interest in time series foundation models is accelerating rapidly. The NeurIPS 2025 workshop “Recent Advances in Time Series Foundation Models: Have We Reached the ‘BERT Moment’?” (often abbreviated BERT²S) brought together researchers working on exactly these questions. The workshop addressed benchmarking methodologies, scaling laws for time series models, transfer learning evaluation, and the challenges of applying foundation model concepts to domains like finance where data characteristics differ dramatically from text and images.

The academic momentum is clear. Google continues to develop TimesFM. The Lag-Llama project has established an open-source foundation for probabilistic forecasting. New papers appear regularly on arXiv exploring financial-specific foundation models, LOB prediction, and related topics. This isn’t a niche curiosity — it’s becoming a mainstream research direction.

For quant practitioners, the message is equally clear: pay attention. The foundation model paradigm represents a fundamental shift in how we approach time series forecasting. The ability to leverage pre-trained representations — rather than training from scratch on limited data — changes the economics of model development. It may also change which problems are tractable.

Conclusion

Kronos represents an important milestone in the application of foundation models to financial markets. Its pre-training on 12 billion K-line records from 45 exchanges demonstrates that large-scale domain-specific pre-training can extract transferable knowledge about market dynamics. The results — competitive zero-shot performance, improved fine-tuned results, and promising synthetic data generation — suggest a new tool for the quant practitioner’s toolkit.

But let’s not overheat. This is 2025, not the year AI solves markets. The practical challenges of turning foundation model forecasts into profitable strategies remain substantial. GARCH and ARIMA aren’t obsolete; they’re complementary. The key is understanding when each approach adds value. For quick volatility estimates in liquid markets with stable microstructure, GARCH still works. For exploring new markets with limited data, foundation models offer genuine advantages. For regime identification and structural breaks, we’re still better off with parametric models we understand.

What excites me most is the synthetic data generation capability. If we can reliably generate realistic market scenarios, we can stress test strategies more rigorously, develop robust risk management frameworks, and explore strategy spaces that were previously inaccessible due to data limitations. That’s genuinely new. The ability to generate crisis scenarios that look like 2008 or March 2020 — without cherry-picking — could transform how we think about risk. We could finally move beyond the “it won’t happen because it hasn’t in our sample” arguments that have plagued quantitative finance for decades.

But even here, caution is warranted. Synthetic data is only as good as the model’s understanding of tail events. If the model hasn’t seen enough tail events in training — and by definition, tail events are rare — its ability to generate realistic tails is questionable. The saying “garbage in, garbage out” applies to synthetic data generation as much as anywhere else.

The broader foundation model approach to time series — whether through Kronos, TimesFM, Lag-Llama, or the models yet to come — is worth serious attention. These are not magic bullets, but they represent a meaningful evolution in our methodological toolkit. For quants willing to learn new approaches while maintaining skepticism about hype, the next few years offer real opportunity. The question isn’t whether foundation models will matter for quant finance; it’s how quickly they can be integrated into production workflows in a way that’s robust, interpretable, and economically valuable.

I’m keeping an open mind while holding firm on skepticism. That’s served me well in 25 years of quantitative finance. It will serve us well here too.


Author’s Assessment: Bull Case vs. Bear Case

The Bull Case: Kronos demonstrates that large-scale domain-specific pre-training on financial data extracts genuinely transferable knowledge. The zero-shot performance on unseen markets is real — a model that’s never seen a particular futures contract can still generate reasonable volatility forecasts. For new market entry, cross-asset correlation modelling, and synthetic scenario generation, this is genuinely valuable. The synthetic data capability alone could transform backtesting robustness, letting us stress-test strategies against crisis scenarios that occur once every 20 years without waiting for history to repeat.

The Bear Case: The paper benchmarks on MSE and CRPS — statistical metrics, not economic ones. A model that improves next-candle MSE by 5% may have an information coefficient of 0.01 — statistically detectable at 12 billion observations but worthless after bid-ask spreads. More fundamentally, training on 12 billion samples of approximately-IID noise teaches the model the shape of noise, not exploitable alpha. The pre-training captures volatility clustering (a risk characteristic), not conditional mean predictability (an alpha characteristic). GARCH does the former with two parameters and full transparency; Kronos does it with millions of parameters and a black box. Show me a backtest with realistic execution costs before calling this a trading signal.

The Bottom Line: Kronos is a promising research direction, not a production alpha engine. The most defensible near-term value is in synthetic data augmentation for stress testing — a workflow enhancement, not a signal source. Build institutional familiarity, run controlled pilots, but don’t deploy for live trading until someone demonstrates economically exploitable returns after costs. The foundation model paradigm is directionally correct; the empirical evidence for direct alpha generation remains unproven.

Hands-On: Kronos vs GARCH

Let’s test the sidebar’s claim directly. We’ll fit a GARCH(1,1) to the same futures data and compare its volatility forecast to what Chronos produces:

import yfinance as yf
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from arch import arch_model
from chronos import ChronosPipeline

# Fetch data
data = yf.download("ES=F", period="1y", progress=False)
returns = data['Close'].pct_change().dropna() * 100

# Split: use 80% for fitting, 20% for testing
split = int(len(returns) * 0.8)
train, test = returns[:split], returns[split:]

# GARCH(1,1) forecast
garch = arch_model(train, vol='Garch', p=1, q=1, dist='normal')
garch_fit = garch.fit(disp='off')
garch_forecast = garch_fit.forecast(horizon=len(test)).variance.iloc[-1].values

# Chronos forecast
pipeline = ChronosPipeline.from_pretrained("amazon/chronos-t5-large", device_map="cuda")
chronos_preds = pipeline.predict(train.values, prediction_length=len(test))
chronos_forecast = np.std(chronos_preds, axis=0) # Volatility as std dev

# MSE comparison
garch_mse = np.mean((garch_forecast - test.values**2)**2)
chronos_mse = np.mean((chronos_forecast - test.values**2)**2)

print(f"GARCH MSE: {garch_mse:.4f}")
print(f"Chronos MSE: {chronos_mse:.4f}")

# Plot
fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(10, 4))
ax.plot(test.index, test.values**2, label="Realized", color="black", alpha=0.7)
ax.plot(test.index, garch_forecast, label="GARCH", color="blue")
ax.plot(test.index, chronos_forecast, label="Chronos", color="orange")
ax.set_title("Volatility Forecast: GARCH vs Foundation Model")
ax.legend()
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()

Volatility Forecast Comparison: GARCH(1,1) vs Chronos Foundation Model

Volatility Forecast Comparison: GARCH(1,1) vs Chronos Foundation Model

The bear case isn’t wrong: GARCH does volatility with 2 interpretable parameters and transparent assumptions. The foundation model uses millions of parameters. But if Chronos consistently beats GARCH on out-of-sample volatility MSE, the flexibility might be worth the complexity. Try running this yourself — the answer depends on the regime.

Implied Volatility in Merton’s Jump Diffusion Model

The “implied volatility” corresponding to an option price is the value of the volatility parameter for which the Black-Scholes model gives the same price. A well-known phenomenon in market option prices is the “volatility smile”, in which the implied volatility increases for strike values away from the spot price. The jump diffusion model is a generalization of Black\[Dash]Scholes in which the stock price has randomly occurring jumps in addition to the random walk behavior. One of the interesting properties of this model is that it displays the volatility smile effect. In this Demonstration, we explore the Black-Scholes implied volatility of option prices (equal for both put and call options) in the jump diffusion model. The implied volatility is modeled as a function of the ratio of option strike price to spot price.


The Hedged Volatility Strategy

Being short regular Volatility ETFs or long Inverse Volatility ETFs are winning strategies…most of the time. The challenge is that when the VIX spikes or when the VIX futures curve is downward sloping instead of upward sloping, very significant losses can occur. Many people have built and back-tested models that attempt to move from long to short to neutral positions in the various Volatility ETFs, but almost all of them have one or both of these very significant flaws: 1) Failure to use “out of sample” back-testing and 2) Failure to protect against “black swan” events.

In this strategy a position and weighting in the appropriate Volatility ETFs are established based on a multi-factor model which always uses out of sample back-testing to determine effectiveness. Volatility Options are always used to protect against significant short-term moves which left unchecked could result in the total loss of one’s portfolio value; these options will usually lose money, but that is a small price to pay for the protection they provide. (Strategies should be scaled at a minimum of 20% to ensure options protection.)

This is a good strategy for IRA accounts in which short selling is not allowed. Long positions in Inverse Volatility ETFs are typically held. Suggested minimum capital: $26,000 (using 20% scaling).

Covered Writes, Covered Wrongs

What is a Covered Call?

covered call (or covered write or buy-write) is a long position in a security and a short position in a call option on that security.  The diagram below constructs the covered call payoff diagram, including the option premium, at expiration when the call option is written at a $100 strike with a $25 option premium.

Payoff

Equity index covered calls are an attractive strategy to many investors because they have realized returns not much lower than those of the equity market but with much lower volatility.  But investors often do the trade for the wrong reasons:  there are a number of myths about covered writes that persist even amongst professional options traders.  I have heard most, if not all of them professed by seasons floor traders on the American Stock Exchange and, I confess, I have even used one or two of them myself.  Roni Israelov and Larn Nielsen of AQR Capital Management, LLC have done a fine job of elucidating and then dispelling these misunderstandings about the strategy, in their paper Covered Call Strategies: One Fact and Eight Myths, Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 70, No. 6, 2014.

SSALGOTRADING AD

The Cover Call Strategy and its Benefits for Investors

The covered call strategy has generated attention due to its attractive historical risk-adjusted returns. For example, the CBOE S&P 500 BuyWrite Index, the industry-standard covered call benchmark, is commonly described as providing average returns comparable to the S&P 500 Index with approximately two-thirds the volatility, supported by statistics such as those shown below.

Table 1

The key advantages of the strategy (compared to an outright, delta-one position) include lower volatility, beta and tail risk.  As a consequence, the strategy produces higher risk-adjusted rates if return (Sharpe Ratio).  Note, too, the beta convexity of the strategy, a topic I cover in this post:

http://jonathankinlay.com/2017/05/beta-convexity/

Although the BuyWrite Index has historically demonstrated similar total returns to the S&P 500, it does so with a reduced beta to the S&P 500 Index. However, it is important to also understand that the BuyWrite Index is more exposed to negative S&P 500 returns than positive returns. This asymmetric relationship to the S&P 500 is consistent with its payoff characteristics and results from the fact that a covered call strategy sells optionality. What this means in simple terms is that while drawdowns are somewhat mitigated by the revenue associated with call writing, the upside is capped by those same call options.

Understandably, a strategy that produces equity-like return with lower beta and lower risk attracts considerable attention from investors.  According to Moringstar, growth in assets under management in covered call strategies has been over 25% per year over the 10 years through June 2014 with over $45 billion currently invested.

Myths about the Covered Call Strategy

Many option strategies are the subject of investor myths, partly, I suppose, because option strategies are relatively complicated and entail risks in several dimensions.  So it is quite easy for investors to become confused.  Simple anecdotes are attractive because they appear to cut through the complexity with an easily understood metaphor, but they can often be misleading.  An example is the widely-held view – even amongst professional option traders – is that selling volatility via strangles is a less risk approach than selling at-the-money straddles. Intuitively, this makes sense:  why wouldn’t  selling straddles that have strike prices (far) away from the current spot price be less risky than selling straddles that have strike prices close to the spot price?  But, in fact, it turns out that selling straddles is the less risky the two strategies – see this post for details:

http://jonathankinlay.com/2016/11/selling-volatility/

Likewise, the covered call strategy is subject to a number of “urban myths”, that turn out to be unfounded:

Myth 1: Risk exposure is described by the payoff diagram

That is only true at expiration.  Along the way, the positions will be marked-to-market and may produce a substantially different payoff if the trade is terminated early.  The same holds true for a zero-coupon bond – we know the terminal value for certain, but there can be considerable variation in the value of the asset from day to day.

Myth 2: Covered calls provide downside protection

This is partially true, but only in a very limited sense.  Unlike a long option hedge, the “protection” in a buy-write strategy is limited to only the premium collected on the option sale, a relatively modest amount in most cases.  Consider a covered call position on a $100 stock with a $10 at-the-money call premium. The covered call can potentially lose $90 and the long call option can lose $10. Each position has the same 50% exposure to the stock, but the covered call’s downside risk is disproportionate to its stock exposure. This is consistent with the covered call’s realized upside and downside betas as discussed earlier.

Myth 3: Covered calls generate income.

Remember that income is revenue minus costs.

It is true that option selling generates positive cash flow, but this incorrectly leads investors to the conclusion that covered calls generate investment income.  Just as is the case with bond issuance, the revenue generated from selling the call option is not income (though, like income, the cash flows received from selling options are considered taxable for many investors). In order for there to be investment income or earnings, the option must be sold at a favorable price – the option’s implied volatility needs to be higher than the stock’s expected volatility.

Myth 4: Covered calls on high-volatility stocks and/or shorter-dated options provide higher yield.

Though true that high volatility stocks and short-dated options command higher annualized premiums, insurance on riskier assets should rationally command a higher premium and selling insurance more often per year should provide higher annual premiums. However, these do not equate to higher net income or yield. For instance, if options are properly priced (e.g., according to the Black-Scholes pricing model), then selling 12 at-the-money options will generate approximately 3.5 times the cash flow of selling a single annual option, but this does not unequivocally translate into higher net profits as discussed earlier. Assuming fairly priced options, higher revenue is not necessarily a mechanism for increasing investment income.

The key point here is that what matters is value, not price. In other words, expected investment profits are generated by the option’s richness, not the option’s price. For example, if you want to short a stock with what you consider to be a high valuation, then the goal is not to find a stock with a high price, but rather one that is overpriced relative to its fundamental value. The same principle applies to options. It is not appropriate to seek an option with a high price or other characteristics associated with high prices. Investors must instead look for options that are expensive relative to their fundamental value.  Put another way, the investor should seek out options trading at a higher implied volatility than the likely futures realized volatility over the life of the option.

Myth 5: Time decay of options written works in your favor.

While it is true that the value of an option declines over time as it approaches expiration, that is not the whole story.  In fact an option’s expected intrinsic value increases as the underlying security realizes volatility.  What matters is whether the realized volatility turns out to be lower than the volatility baked into the option price – the implied volatility.  In truth, an option’s time decay only works in the seller’s favor if the option is initially priced expensive relative to its fundamental value. If the option is priced cheaply, then time decay works very much against the seller.

Myth 6: Covered calls are appropriate if you have a neutral to moderately bullish view.

This myth is an over-simplification.  In selling a call option you are expressing a view, not only on the future prospects for the stock, but also on its likely future volatility.  It is entirely possible that the stock could stall (or even decline) and yet the value of the option you have sold rises due, say, to takeover rumors.  A neutral view on the stock may imply a belief that the security price will not move far from its current price rather than its expected return is zero. If so, then a short straddle position is a way to express that view — not a covered call — because, in this case, no active position should be taken in the security.

Myth 7: Overwriting pays you for doing what you were going to do anyway

This myth is typically posed as the following question: if you have a price target for selling a stock you own, why not get paid to write a call option struck at that price target?

In fact this myth exposes the critical difference between a plan and a contractual obligation. If the former case, suppose that the stock hits your target price very much more quickly than you had anticipated, perhaps as a result of a new product announcement that you had not anticipated at the time you set your target.  In those circumstances you might very well choose to maintain your long position and revise your price target upwards. This is an example of a plan – a successful one – that can be adjusted to suit circumstances as they change.

A covered call strategy is an obligation, rather than a plan.  You have pre-sold the stock at the target price and, in the above scenario, you cannot change your mind in order to benefit from additional potential upside in the stock.

In other words, with a covered call strategy you have monetized the optionality that is inherent in any plan and turned it into a contractual obligation in exchange for a fee.

Myth 8: Overwriting allows you to buy a stock at a discounted price.

Here is how this myth is typically framed: if a stock that you would like to own is currently priced at $100 and that you think is currently expensive, you can act on that opinion by selling a naked put option at a $95 strike price and collect a premium of say $1. Then, if the price subsequently declines below the strike price, the option will likely be exercised thus requiring you to buy the stock for $95. Including the $1 premium, you effectively buy the stock at a 6% discount. If the option is not exercised you keep the premium as income. So, this type of outcome for selling naked put options may also lead you to conclude that the equivalent covered call strategy makes sense and is valuable.

But this argument is really a sleight of hand.  In our example above, if the option is exercised, then when you buy the stock for $95 you won’t care what the stock price was when you sold the option. What matters is the stock price on the date the option was exercised. If the stock price dropped all the way down to $80, the $95 purchase price no longer seems like a discount. Your P&L will show a mark-to-market loss of $14 ($95 – $80 – $1). The initial stock price is irrelevant and the $1 premium hardly helps.

Conclusion: How to Think About the Covered Call Strategy

Investors should ignore the misleading storytelling about obtaining downside buffers and generating income. A covered call strategy only generates income to the extent that any other strategy generates income, by buying or selling mispriced securities or securities with an embedded risk premium. Avoid the temptation to overly focus on payoff diagrams. If you believe the index will rise and implied volatilities are rich, a covered call is a step in the right direction towards expressing that view.

If you have no view on implied volatility, there is no reason to sell options, or covered calls

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Range-Based EGARCH Option Pricing Models (REGARCH)

The research in this post and the related paper on Range Based EGARCH Option pricing Models is focused on the innovative range-based volatility models introduced in Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) (hereafter ABD).  We develop new option pricing models using multi-factor diffusion approximations couched within this theoretical framework and examine their properties in comparison with the traditional Black-Scholes model.

The two-factor version of the model, which I have applied successfully in various option arbitrage strategies, encapsulates the intuively appealing idea of a trending long term mean volatility process, around which oscillates a mean-reverting, transient volatility process.  The option pricing model also incorporates asymmetry/leverage effects and well as correlation effects between the asset return and volatility processes, which results in a volatility skew.

The core concept behind Range-Based Exponential GARCH model is Log-Range estimator discussed in an earlier post on volatility metrics, which contains a lengthy exposition of various volatility estimators and their properties. (Incidentally, for those of you who requested a copy of my paper on Estimating Historical Volatility, I have updated the post to include a link to the pdf).

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We assume that the log stock price s follows a drift-less Brownian motion ds = sdW. The volatility of daily log returns, denoted h= s/sqrt(252), is assumed constant within each day, at ht from the beginning to the end of day t, but is allowed to change from one day to the next, from ht at the end of day t to ht+1 at the beginning of day t+1.  Under these assumptions, ABD show that the log range, defined as:

is to a very good approximation distributed as

where N[m; v] denotes a Gaussian distribution with mean m and variance v. The above equation demonstrates that the log range is a noisy linear proxy of log volatility ln ht.  By contrast, according to the results of Alizadeh, Brandt,and Diebold (2002), the log absolute return has a mean of 0.64 + ln ht and a variance of 1.11. However, the distribution of the log absolute return is far from Gaussian.  The fact that both the log range and the log absolute return are linear log volatility proxies (with the same loading of one), but that the standard deviation of the log range is about one-quarter of the standard deviation of the log absolute return, makes clear that the range is a much more informative volatility proxy. It also makes sense of the finding of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) that the daily range has approximately the same informational content as sampling intra-daily returns every four hours.

Except for the model of Chou (2001), GARCH-type volatility models rely on squared or absolute returns (which have the same information content) to capture variation in the conditional volatility ht. Since the range is a more informative volatility proxy, it makes sense to consider range-based GARCH models, in which the range is used in place of squared or absolute returns to capture variation in the conditional volatility. This is particularly true for the EGARCH framework of Nelson (1990), which describes the dynamics of log volatility (of which the log range is a linear proxy).

ABD consider variants of the EGARCH framework introduced by Nelson (1990). In general, an EGARCH(1,1) model performs comparably to the GARCH(1,1) model of Bollerslev (1987).  However, for stock indices the in-sample evidence reported by Hentschel (1995) and the forecasting performance presented by Pagan and Schwert (1990) show a slight superiority of the EGARCH specification. One reason for this superiority is that EGARCH models can accommodate asymmetric volatility (often called the “leverage effect,” which refers to one of the explanations of asymmetric volatility), where increases in volatility are associated more often with large negative returns than with equally large positive returns.

The one-factor range-based model (REGARCH 1)  takes the form:

where the returns process Rt is conditionally Gaussian: Rt ~ N[0, ht2]

and the process innovation is defined as the standardized deviation of the log range from its expected value:

Following Engle and Lee (1999), ABD also consider multi-factor volatility models.  In particular, for a two-factor range-based EGARCH model (REGARCH2), the conditional volatility dynamics) are as follows:

and

where ln qt can be interpreted as a slowly-moving stochastic mean around which log volatility  ln ht makes large but transient deviations (with a process determined by the parameters kh, fh and dh).

The parameters q, kq, fq and dq determine the long-run mean, sensitivity of the long run mean to lagged absolute returns, and the asymmetry of absolute return sensitivity respectively.

The intuition is that when the lagged absolute return is large (small) relative to the lagged level of volatility, volatility is likely to have experienced a positive (negative) innovation. Unfortunately, as we explained above, the absolute return is a rather noisy proxy of volatility, suggesting that a substantial part of the volatility variation in GARCH-type models is driven by proxy noise as opposed to true information about volatility. In other words, the noise in the volatility proxy introduces noise in the implied volatility process. In a volatility forecasting context, this noise in the implied volatility process deteriorates the quality of the forecasts through less precise parameter estimates and, more importantly, through less precise estimates of the current level of volatility to which the forecasts are anchored.

read more

2-Factor REGARCH Model for the S&P500 Index

On Testing Direction Prediction Accuracy


As regards the question of forecasting accuracy discussed in the paper on Forecasting Volatility in the S&P 500 Index, there are two possible misunderstandings here that need to be cleared up.  These arise from remarks by one commentator  as follows:

“An above 50% vol direction forecast looks good,.. but “direction” is biased when working with highly skewed distributions!   ..so it would be nice if you could benchmark it against a simple naive predictors to get a feel for significance, -or- benchmark it with a trading strategy and see how the risk/return performs.”

(i) The first point is simple, but needs saying: the phrase “skewed distributions” in the context of volatility modeling could easily be misconstrued as referring to the volatility skew. This, of course, is used to describe to the higher implied vols seen in the Black-Scholes prices of OTM options. But in the Black-Scholes framework volatility is constant, not stochastic, and the “skew” referred to arises in the distribution of the asset return process, which has heavier tails than the Normal distribution (excess Kurtosis and/or skewness). I realize that this is probably not what the commentator meant, but nonetheless it’s worth heading that possible misunderstanding off at the pass, before we go on.

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(ii) I assume that the commentator was referring to the skewness in the volatility process, which is characterized by the LogNormal distribution. But the forecasting tests referenced in the paper are tests of the ability of the model to predict the direction of volatility, i.e. the sign of the change in the level of volatility from the current period to the next period. Thus we are looking at, not a LogNormal distribution, but the difference in two LogNormal distributions with equal mean – and this, of course, has an expectation of zero. In other words, the expected level of volatility for the next period is the same as the current period and the expected change in the level of volatility is zero. You can test this very easily for yourself by generating a large number of observations from a LogNormal process, taking the difference and counting the number of positive and negative changes in the level of volatility from one period to the next. You will find, on average, half the time the change of direction is positive and half the time it is negative.

For instance, the following chart shows the distribution of the number of positive changes in the level of a LogNormally distributed random variable with mean and standard deviation of 0.5, for a sample of 1,000 simulations, each of 10,000 observations.  The sample mean (5,000.4) is very close to the expected value of 5,000.

Distribution Number of Positive Direction Changes

So, a naive predictor will forecast volatility to remain unchanged for the next period and by random chance approximately half the time volatility will turn out to be higher and half the time it will turn out to be lower than in the current period. Hence the default probability estimate for a positive change of direction is 50% and you would expect to be right approximately half of the time. In other words, the direction prediction accuracy of the naive predictor is 50%. This, then, is one of the key benchmarks you use to assess the ability of the model to predict market direction. That is what test statistics like Theil’s-U does – measures the performance relative to the naive predictor. The other benchmark we use is the change of direction predicted by the implied volatility of ATM options.
In this context, the model’s 61% or higher direction prediction accuracy is very significant (at the 4% level in fact) and this is reflected in the Theil’s-U statistic of 0.82 (lower is better). By contrast, Theil’s-U for the Implied Volatility forecast is 1.46, meaning that IV is a much worse predictor of 1-period-ahead changes in volatility than the naive predictor.

On its face, it is because of this exceptional direction prediction accuracy that a simple strategy is able to generate what appear to be abnormal returns using the change of direction forecasts generated by the model, as described in the paper. In fact, the situation is more complicated than that, once you introduce the concept of a market price of volatility risk.

 

Modeling Asset Volatility

I am planning a series of posts on the subject of asset volatility and option pricing and thought I would begin with a survey of some of the central ideas. The attached presentation on Modeling Asset Volatility sets out the foundation for a number of key concepts and the basis for the research to follow.

Perhaps the most important feature of volatility is that it is stochastic rather than constant, as envisioned in the Black Scholes framework.  The presentation addresses this issue by identifying some of the chief stylized facts about volatility processes and how they can be modelled.  Certain characteristics of volatility are well known to most analysts, such as, for instance, its tendency to “cluster” in periods of higher and lower volatility.  However, there are many other typical features that are less often rehearsed and these too are examined in the presentation.

Long Memory
For example, while it is true that GARCH models do a fine job of modeling the clustering effect  they typically fail to capture one of the most important features of volatility processes – long term serial autocorrelation.  In the typical GARCH model autocorrelations die away approximately exponentially, and historical events are seen to have little influence on the behaviour of the process very far into the future.  In volatility processes that is typically not the case, however:  autocorrelations die away very slowly and historical events may continue to affect the process many weeks, months or even years ahead.

Volatility Direction Prediction Accuracy
Volatility Direction Prediction Accuracy

There are two immediate and very important consequences of this feature.  The first is that volatility processes will tend to trend over long periods – a characteristic of Black Noise or Fractionally Integrated processes, compared to the White Noise behavior that typically characterizes asset return processes.  Secondly, and again in contrast with asset return processes, volatility processes are inherently predictable, being conditioned to a significant degree on past behavior.  The presentation considers the fractional integration frameworks as a basis for modeling and forecasting volatility.

Mean Reversion vs. Momentum
A puzzling feature of much of the literature on volatility is that it tends to stress the mean-reverting behavior of volatility processes.  This appears to contradict the finding that volatility behaves as a reinforcing process, whose long-term serial autocorrelations create a tendency to trend.  This leads to one of the most important findings about asset processes in general, and volatility process in particular: i.e. that the assets processes are simultaneously trending and mean-reverting.  One way to understand this is to think of volatility, not as a single process, but as the superposition of two processes:  a long term process in the mean, which tends to reinforce and trend, around which there operates a second, transient process that has a tendency to produce short term spikes in volatility that decay very quickly.  In other words, a transient, mean reverting processes inter-linked with a momentum process in the mean.  The presentation discusses two-factor modeling concepts along these lines, and about which I will have more to say later.

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Cointegration
One of the most striking developments in econometrics over the last thirty years, cointegration is now a principal weapon of choice routinely used by quantitative analysts to address research issues ranging from statistical arbitrage to portfolio construction and asset allocation.  Back in the late 1990’s I and a handful of other researchers realized that volatility processes exhibited very powerful cointegration tendencies that could be harnessed to create long-short volatility strategies, mirroring the approach much beloved by equity hedge fund managers.  In fact, this modeling technique provided the basis for the Caissa Capital volatility fund, which I founded in 2002.  The presentation examines characteristics of multivariate volatility processes and some of the ideas that have been proposed to model them, such as FIGARCH (fractionally-integrated GARCH).

Dispersion Dynamics
Finally, one topic that is not considered in the presentation, but on which I have spent much research effort in recent years, is the behavior of cross-sectional volatility processes, which I like to term dispersion.  It turns out that, like its univariate cousin, dispersion displays certain characteristics that in principle make it highly forecastable.  Given an appropriate model of dispersion dynamics, the question then becomes how to monetize efficiently the insight that such a model offers.  Again, I will have much more to say on this subject, in future.

Forecasting Volatility in the S&P500 Index

Several people have asked me for copies of this research article, which develops a new theoretical framework, the ARFIMA-GARCH model as a basis for forecasting volatility in the S&P 500 Index.  I am in the process of updating the research, but in the meantime a copy of the original paper is available here

In this analysis we are concerned with the issue of whether market forecasts of volatility, as expressed in the Black-Scholes implied volatilities of at-the-money European options on the S&P500 Index, are superior to those produced by a new forecasting model in the GARCH framework which incorporates long-memory effects.  The ARFIMA-GARCH model, which uses high frequency data comprising 5-minute returns, makes volatility the subject process of interest, to which innovations are introduced via a volatility-of-volatility (kurtosis) process.  Despite performing robustly in- and out-of-sample, an encompassing regression indicates that the model is unable to add to the information already contained in market forecasts.  However, unlike model forecasts, implied volatility forecasts show evidence of a consistent and substantial bias.  Furthermore, the model is able to correctly predict the direction of volatility approximately 62% of the time whereas market forecasts have very poor direction prediction ability.  This suggests that either option markets may be inefficient, or that the option pricing model is mis-specified.  To examine this hypothesis, an empirical test is carried out in which at-the-money straddles are bought or sold (and delta-hedged) depending on whether the model forecasts exceed or fall below implied volatility forecasts.  This simple strategy generates an annual compound return of 18.64% over a four year out-of-sample period, during which the annual return on the S&P index itself was -7.24%.  Our findings suggest that, over the period of analysis, investors required an additional risk premium of 88 basis points of incremental return for each unit of volatility risk.